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Abstract 
 
This article draws on a new survey of British citizens to test the hypothesis that there are two quite 
distinctive types of attitude prevalent among those who are ‘disaffected’ with politics, the ‘dissatisfied 
democratic’ and ‘stealth democratic’ orientations, the former being more widespread in the UK. While 
neither manifests a high level of trust for the political elite, the dissatisfied democratic citizen is 
politically interested, efficacious and desires greater political participation, while the contrary is 
generally true of the stealth democrat. However, although stealth democrats are unwilling to engage in 
most forms of participation or deliberation, they are ambiguous about direct democracy, which can be 
attributed to the populist nature of stealth democratic attitudes.  
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Introduction
1
 
The world’s established democracies are replete with talk of political alienation and apathy on the part 
of citizens. The blame for this state of affairs has been laid at the door of various culprits, including 
politicians, political parties and other major institutions and processes of representative democracy, the 
mass media, and occasionally even on the citizens themselves. Putative solutions to the problem tend 
to depend on where critics apportion the principal source of blame: those who regard the shortcomings 
of representative democracy per se as central to the problem are inclined to argue that the answer lies 
in institutional innovations that will bring significant new forms of political participation for ordinary 
citizens; those who are more inclined to blame the impact of the media, consumerist culture or the 
failure of the public to understand the nature of politics, see more potential in recourse to better 
regulation of the media or improved civic education. This article seeks to shed light on the viability of 
proposals for greater participation in the UK by analysing the attitudes of citizens towards mainstream 
forms of participation, deliberative democracy and referendums. It argues that there is a fundamental 
difference of outlook between two quite different types of disaffected citizen, and that one of these 
types – which has been referred to as 'stealth democratic' elsewhere in the literature – is essentially 
populist in orientation. While reforms designed to enhance political participation may well meet the 
aspirations of some citizens, it is not so clear that they will work for these populist stealth democrats. 
This leaves a considerable challenge for researchers and institutional designers. 
                                                 
1 I am grateful for very helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper by Tim Bale, Sabina Avdagic, Lee Savage, 
Emilie van Haute, Jean-Benoit Pilet and Matt Wall. Sole responsibility for the article lies with me, of course.  
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The Intellectual Context 
There is now a considerable body of evidence attesting to popular dissatisfaction with the political 
process and its major institutions and actors in the world's established liberal democracies. In the case 
of Britain, a particular crescendo of complaint and protest about politicians erupted in the context of the 
Westminster expenses scandals in 2009, though more general evidence of political alienation has been 
apparent for far longer – and across a wide array of political systems. Much, though not all, is directed 
at parties and incorporates various forms of anti-party sentiment (thus, parties are widely held to be 
self-interested, untrustworthy, corrupt, ineffective and increasingly irrelevant). Similarly, public trust in 
politicians is consistently low. 
 Of course, especially in the light of the scandals over MPs expenses, some of this negativity can 
reasonably be seen as deserved. But bad faith, and self-regarding or corrupt behaviour by politicians is, 
in reality, nothing new.  Why, then, is it only in recent years that anti-party sentiment and citizen 
disaffection has become so pronounced? Various explanations can be found in the literature. Russell 
Dalton (2004), for instance, rejects country-specific explanations and points to two general trends. The 
first is rising expectations of government among citizens, especially the young, the better educated, the 
more affluent, and the post-materialist, who, partly because they believe in democracy, are also the 
most inclined to criticise. While these are the very groups that have most directly benefited from the 
spread of affluence, their expectations have increased the most, as has their tendency to criticise 
political elites, institutions and processes. Yet they do not represent a threat to democracy per se; on the 
contrary, these ‘dissatisfied democrats’ are driven by a passion for the democratic creed that fosters 
disillusionment with the way current political processes operate. A second general source of decreasing 
political support is the growing complexity of contemporary political agendas and mobilisation. New 
debates over environmental quality, social norms, lifestyle choices, multiculturalism, and other social 
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and cultural issues have led to the triumph of interest articulation over interest aggregation. In such 
fluid, multidimensional policy space it is very difficult for governments to satisfy most of the people 
most of the time. Moreover the mobilization of ‘dissatisfied democrats’ makes aggregation more 
difficult still and provokes a demand for reform that goes beyond tinkering with the core institutions of 
representative democracy (parties, elections, parliaments) to an increase in direct public involvement in 
the political process. This in turn threatens to exacerbate the imbalance between the ever-growing 
clamour of articulated interests and the need for institutions that can effectively channel divergent 
demands into coherent and effective policy programmes. 
 In fact, there is widespread interest in participatory democracy in general, and in various forms 
of deliberative or ‘dialogic’ democracy in particular (see, eg, Pateman, 1970; 2012; Bessette 1980; 
Cohen 1989; Fishkin 1991; Nino 1996; Ackerman & Fishkin 2004). These are often favoured as 
solutions to the problem of political alienation, and enthusiasm extends beyond political theorists: In 
the UK, The Power Inquiry (2006) advocated more participation, among other things, and 
commissioned James Fishkin to run its own deliberative exercise in January 2010. The British 
government’s own Green Paper, The Governance of Britain (CM7170 2007), proposed use of citizen 
juries in local politics and the White Paper Communities in Control (CM7247 2008) advocated the 
spread of participatory budgeting in local government. At European level, too, there is significant 
official interest in the potential of participation through e-democracy (Council of Europe 2009). 
However, there is of course a long tradition of democratic theory, going back to Schumpeter and Weber, 
which is generally sceptical of the supposed benefits of participatory democracy, and which casts doubt 
on the claim that it would work better than ‘actually existing democracy’ (see Bellamy 2007: 161-3). 
The most striking contribution in recent years has been made by John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-
Morse (2002) in their research on American voters. Drawing on findings from focus groups and 
surveys, they sternly rebuff the participationist claims, arguing that people: 
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...do not want to make political decisions themselves; they do not want to provide much input to 
those who are assigned to make these decisions; and they would rather not know the details of 
the decision-making process…This does not mean that people think no mechanism for 
government accountability is necessary; they just do not want the mechanism to come into play 
except in unusual circumstances. 
 
As Clive James (2009) might put it, democracy is '...that political system that leaves me free not to care 
about it.' Hibbing and Theiss-Morse summarise the orientations of American citizens as a preference 
for some kind of ‘stealth’ arrangement, whereby citizens know that democracy exists, but expect it to 
be barely visible on a routine basis – an attitude that they describe as naïve and unfeasible. The upshot 
of their Stealth Democracy study is that the authors criticise both the naïveté of popular attitudes 
towards politics, and the insistence of some observers that participatory democracy provides the 
solution to its current discontents. The alleged benefits of participatory - especially deliberative - 
democracy are portrayed by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse as ‘wishful thinking’, and they point out that 
research tends to reveal that it only works under very limited conditions. ‘Deliberation will not work in 
the real world of politics where people are different and where tough, zero-sum decisions must be 
made…real deliberation is quite likely to make them hopping mad or encourage them to suffer silently 
because of a reluctance to voice their own opinions in the discussion' (2002: 207). They cite a variety 
of research evidence to debunk three of the major claims of the participationists: that deliberative and 
participatory democracy produces better decision-making (actually, the most powerful personalities 
often dominate, whether or not they are the best-informed or most rational); that it enhances the 
legitimacy of the political system (in fact, face-to-face conflict just exacerbates people’s anger and 
resentment (Morrell 1999); and that it leads to personal development (again, it just exacerbates the 
sense of powerlessness, inadequacy and marginalization of the weakest participants). Indeed, Diana 
Mutz (2006) has gone so far as to argue that high-intensity deliberation around political differences can 
actually reduce the inclination of many people to participate in politics, because of the desire to avoid 
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conflict. Not surprisingly perhaps, and borrowing from the terminology of principal-agent analysis, 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse found that citizens (the principals) prefer to guard against their agents’ 
(politicians and parties) presumed tendency to shirk, not through ‘police-patrol’ oversight – direct, 
continuous and proactive – but through ‘fire-alarm’ oversight – mediated, episodic and reactive 
(McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984). Like Schudson's 'monitorial' citizens, they are watchful and engaged 
in surveying the political scene rather than gathering information intensely, 'poised for action if action 
is required' (Schudson 1999: 8).    
 
That said, recent research from the USA now suggests that the pessimism of writers like Hibbing, 
Theiss-Morse and Mutz may be exaggerated. Using a blend of experimental and survey designs, Neblo 
et al (2009) have investigated American voters' hypothetical willingness to deliberate and their actual 
behaviour in response to a real invitation to deliberate with their member of Congress, and found that 
willingness to deliberate in the US is much more widespread than expected, and that it is precisely the 
demographic groups that are least likely to participate in traditional partisan politics – and therefore 
those whom we would expect to express the stealth democracy perspective - who are actually most 
interested in deliberative participation. However, these findings depend crucially on the particular form 
of deliberation between citizens and elected representatives that is implemented.  Similarly, Bengtsson 
and Mattila (2009) have found that in Finland people with less education, with less political knowledge 
and those who feel that the political system does not respond to their needs – again, those we might 
expect to have 'stealth democratic' attitudes – are actually most likely to want greater use of direct 
democracy in their political system. Of course, it can be argued that direct or referendum democracy is 
not at all the same thing as deliberative democracy or high-intensity participation. On the contrary, it 
has often been regarded as compatible with a populist outlook in  which charismatic leaders have direct 
relationships with the masses, and thereby largely bypass the institutions of representative democracy. 
 I believe that derive at least two major hypotheses may be derived from this literature which  
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merit empirical testing.  The first (H1) holds that there are two quite different types of attitude 
among people who are ‘disaffected’ with politics: a ‘dissatisfied democratic’ orientation (likely to 
be associated with higher social status, well-educated, active and articulate devotees of a vision of 
highly engaged citizens), and a ‘stealth democratic’ orientation (likely to be associated with lower 
social status, less educated, more inactive individuals who have little interest in politics, are  
largely absorbed by private concerns, and only consent to participate in order to keep 
untrustworthy elites in check). The second (H2) is that deliberative participation would at best 
only be effective in respect of those who fit the dissatisfied democratic profile, but would be 
counter-productive with respect to those of stealth democratic orientation. While the former may 
chafe at the participatory limitations of traditional forms of representative democracy, and might thrive 
in a more participative environment, the latter could actually be more vulnerable to political 
marginalization, for they are less likely to take to direct and active engagement. They have traditionally 
depended on parties as key interlocutors and tribunes of their social group interests, but their parties 
(typically of social democratic or labour hue) have often lost this role through strategic adaptation. 
Without representative parties that express their social identities and serve as communities of political 
learning, as was once the case, these citizens retreat into a disaffected and alienated take on politics. 
These feelings will only be exacerbated by evidence of ‘feather-bedding’ by self-interested politicians 
and parties (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse: 121-124).  
 
The implications of the research findings into these issues should be important for the reforms that the 
political elites who attempt to respond to the problem of democratic disconnect devise. New forms of 
radical participatory democracy may not be the answer that some envisage them to be; reforming 
existing systems of representative democracy may be of far greater import, since few citizens are likely 
to care for more demanding levels of political involvement. However, we cannot be sure of this until 
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the empirical research is done. This article constitutes an attempt to test the first of the hypotheses set 
out above in a British context through the analysis of a specially commissioned dataset pertaining to 
samples of British citizens. 
 
A simple typology of citizen orientations towards politics 
The main source of data on which the analysis reported in this article draws is an internet survey of 
British citizens conducted in the summer of 2011. This produced a representative sample of the adult 
population weighted by the major demographic factors and by electoral turnout, so that 65% of the 
sample voted in the 2010 general election, reflecting exactly the actual turnout. This was done in order 
to ensure that we did not over- or under-sample those who might be inclined to participate in political 
activity.
2
 
 
We start the analysis by trying to gauge the presence of 'dissatisfied democrats' and 'stealth democrats' 
in the British electorate through a simple cross-tabulation of just two variables: trust in politicians and 
interest in politics. By definition, both of these groups should be regarded as having low trust in 
politicians, but I conceive of them as differing crucially in terms of their interest in politics: while 
dissatisfied democrats are generally engaged by and interested in politics, stealth democrats are the 
very opposite. If we reduce the number of categories in each of these key variables to just two – high 
and low – then it should be noted that logically we generate two further analytical classes in our simple 
                                                 
2 A targeted quota sampling method was used as opposed to random probability sampling. An iterative process was 
used in order to ensure the data are in the correct proportions for each of the major demographics. This achieved a nationally 
representative sample, with data weighted to the profile of all adults aged 18+ taking into account age, gender, social class, 
region, political party identification, newspaper readership and election turnout in May 2010. Target percentages were 
derived from three sources: Census data; the National Readership survey (a random probability survey comprising 34,000 
random face-to-face interviews conducted annually); and (for party identity) YouGov estimates. The latter were derived 
from an analysis of more than 80,000 responses to YouGov surveys at, or shortly after, the May 2010 general election, when 
respondents were asked both (i) whether they generally thought of themselves as Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat, 
etc. (party identity); and (ii) which party they would support, or had supported, in the 2010 general election. Data were 
weighted to May 2010 party identity wherever this information is available. The weights used for party identity are 
consistent with the outcome of the 2010 general election. The final weighted sample size was 1355.  
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typology: respondents with high political interest and high political trust (whom I would refer to as 
'civic enthusiasts') and those with high trust but low interest (whom I call 'contented democrats'). Table 
1 reports the distribution of our sample between these four analytical classes: clearly, the high trust 
categories are almost residual in size, amounting to less than 10% of the total, while the two low-trust 
types in which we are principally interested in this article absorb most of our cases. The dissatisfied 
democrats outnumber the stealth democrats by two-to-one. 
 
Table 1: A simple typology of democratic orientations 
 Trust in Politicians 
High Trust Low Trust 
Interest in 
Politics 
High Interest Civic Enthusiasts (7.4%) Dissatisfied Democrats (62.1%) 
Low Interest Contented Democrats (1.1%) Stealth Democrats (29.4%) 
 
Cramer's v = .116 (.000), n=997 
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Table 2: Social and political attributes of democratic orientation groups 
Social or Political Attribute Civic Enthusiasts Contented 
Democrats 
Dissatisfied 
Democrats 
Stealth 
Democrats 
N (sig) 
Average Age 
 
46 47 50 45 1355 (.000) 
% graduates 
 
37.3 22.2 40.1 26.1 905 (.000) 
% social class ABC1 
 
57.5 70 58.7 53.1 993 (.125) 
% earning £40,000+ 
 
25.9 14.3 31.4 22.6 722 (.094) 
% female 
 
41.9 45.5 46.8 64.5 997 (.000) 
Mean position on left-right scale 
(5=left-wing, 25=right-wing) 
11.8 15.1 10.3 10.6 944 (.000) 
Mean position on liberty-authority 
scale (6=authoritarian, 30=liberal) 
13.4 13.8 13.4 12.7 926 (.302) 
% with no partisan id. 
 
9.5 33.3 19.2 45.1 998 (.000) 
% very strong partisans 
 
26.4 0 14.8 3.2 872 (.000) 
% saying parties important for 
representation 
90.4 90.9 64 37.5 996 (.000) 
% claiming good understanding of 
politics 
93.2 45.5 74.7 24.5 998 (.000) 
% claiming to be well-informed 
about politics 
85.3 72.7 70.8 16.7 1000 (.000) 
% voted in 2010 election 
 
85.1 36.4 74.2 46.8 997 (.000) 
% saying voters should have direct 
say in law-making 
56.7 45.5 61.8 55.6 988 (.035) 
% saying political elites should be 
left to govern 
71.2 72.7 18.6 16.4 995 (.000) 
 
NOTE: Significance levels refer to Chi-square significances for the cross-tabulations from which these figures are derived, 
or from the ANOVA significances from which averages and scale means are derived. 
 
H1 states an expectation that the dissatisfied democratic orientation will be associated with higher 
social status and levels of education, and support for a politically active citizenry, while the stealth 
democratic orientation will be associated with lower social status and education, and low interest in or 
engagement with politics. Table 2 provides some basic evidence that suggests these expectations are 
largely correct. Two-fifths of dissatisfied democrats are graduates compared to just a quarter of stealth 
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democrats, while 58% of dissatisfied democrats are from the non-manual occupational classes ABC1 
(53% of stealth democrats); not surprisingly, the former are generally higher earners than the latter. It is 
interesting to observe – although it formed no part of the hypothesis – that the stealth democrats are a 
far more female group than the dissatisfied democrats (or indeed, than either of the two high-trust 
categories of respondent). On average, they are virtually indistinguishable from dissatisfied democrats 
in terms of left-right ideology, although they are little less socially liberal.
3
 In almost all respects 
relating to respondent's engagement in political activity or sense of political efficacy, moreover, the 
stealth democrats score lower than the dissatisfied democrats – sometimes very considerably so. Thus, 
they are far more likely to lack a partisan identification, or a very strong sense of partisanship even 
when they do claim some party affinity, and far less inclined to regard political parties as important to 
representing people's interests. They are much less likely to claim that they have a good understanding 
of political issues or to be well-informed about politics, and barely half as likely to have turned out to 
vote at the last general election. Even so, they are only a little less inclined than dissatisfied democrats 
to agree that citizens should 'have a direct say' in making laws, and neither group shows much appetite 
for leaving politicians, civil servants or interest groups alone to make political decisions. This last point 
confirms that both stealth and dissatisfied democrats lack trust in political elites, but it seems clear that 
in many other respects the two groups differ quite notably.  
 
Models of dissatisfied democracy and stealth democracy 
This is but a simple initial exploration of the evidence that bears upon H1. It is important to build more 
sophisticated and robust measures of stealth and dissatisfied democratic orientations and we can do this 
through the construction of attitudinal scales that draw on a variety of indicators relevant to the 
                                                 
3 Left-right ideology and social liberalism-authoritarianism are measured by standard additive scales first devised by 
Heath et al (1993). The former has a theoretical range running from 5 (left-wing) to 25 (right-wing), with a scale mean of  
11.1; Cronbach's Alpha = .868, which confirms the reliability of this measure. The latter has a range running from 6 
(socially authoritarian) to 30 (socially liberal) and a scale mean of 13.5: Alpha = .767.   
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underlying concepts. These scales can then be used in multivariate analysis, both as dependent and 
independent variables: that is, we can deploy them in order first to confirm their demographic and 
attitudinal predictors, and then to gauge their own causal influence on attitudes towards various forms 
of political participation.  
 
The stealth democracy index is an additive scale based on 12 attitudinal items that capture the various 
elements of the concept as I conceive of it. These items include 4 statements with which respondents 
were asked to agree or disagree that were originally devised by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse themselves: 
'Politicians would help the country more if they would stop talking and just take action on important 
problems'; 'What people call ''compromise'' in politics is really just selling out one's principles'; 'Do you 
think that the Government would run better or worse if decisions were left up to non-elected 
independent experts or would it make no difference?';  and 'Do you think that the Government would 
run better or worse if decisions were left up to successful business people or would it make no 
difference?' On their own, these items produce a rather low reliability score (Cronbach's Alpha = .557), 
and do not in any case, I would argue, capture the full nature of the 'stealth democracy' idea as I have 
set it out here. That is, they do not directly tap into people's sense of trust in political elites and actors, 
nor their sense of political interest or personal political efficacy. When Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's 
original index is supplemented with a further 8 items that capture these elements
4
 it produces an 
additive scale with a far more acceptable Alpha score of .755. The scale has a theoretical range of 12-
60, with the top end representing a high stealth orientation; the mean score of our sample on this scale 
is 39.4, which places British citizens slightly closer to the high stealth democracy pole overall.  
                                                 
4 The additional items comprising the stealth democracy index are:  I trust the government to act in the best interests 
of the country; In general, I tend to trust politicians; In general those who are currently involved in decision-making for the 
country, such as politicians, parties, civil servants and interest groups, are best placed to make these decisions; When people 
like me get involved in politics, they really can change the way that the country is run; I consider myself well-qualified to 
participate in politics; I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people; To what extent, if at all, do 
you believe you can influence decisions affecting the country as a whole? How interested, if at all, would you say you are in 
politics?  
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Dissatisfied democratic orientation is measured similarly, this time through an additive scale based on 
responses to five questions which seek to capture how far people show a combination of high political 
interest and efficacy (contrary to stealth democrats), and low trust in elites (similarly to stealth 
democrats).
5
 This scale produces an Alpha reliability score of .690 with a theoretical range running 
from 5 (indicating a low dissatisfied democracy orientation) to 25 (high dissatisfied democracy 
orientation) and a mean of exactly 17.4, suggesting that our sample has a fairly high dissatisfied 
democracy orientation overall. Given my argument that stealth democratic and dissatisfied democratic 
orientations are fundamentally different types of criticism of the political system today, we would not 
generally expect respondents to score highly on both of these scales. Empirically, this is broadly 
confirmed by the simple bivariate correlation of -.531 (.000) between the two indices: stealth and 
dissatisfied democracy orientations are certainly significantly and inversely related to one another. 
However, this is not a perfect association. A simple test is offered by a cross-tabulation in which each 
scale is split half-way along into low and high categories; this reveals that 60% of the sample conform 
exactly to the hypothesized combinations of either a high stealth/low dissatisfied democratic orientation 
(26.1% of total) or a high dissatisfied/low stealth democratic orientation (33.1%). While very few 
respondents (just 2.5% in fact) manage to return low scores on both indices, a significant minority 
(38.3%) do score highly on both. Overall, there are more respondents (71.3%) who can be categorized 
in the high dissatisfied democracy category than in the high stealth democracy category (64.4%), so it 
can be inferred that the former type is more widespread among British citizens.   
 
What of the demographic and ideological correlates of these two indices? Ordinary least squares 
                                                 
5 The  dissatisfied democracy scale items are derived from responses to: I consider myself well-qualified to 
participate in politics; I think that I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people; I feel that I have a 
pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country; In general, I tend to trust politicians; How 
interested, if at all, would you say you are in politics?  
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models can verify the accuracy of H1, as reported in Table 3. These are simple models including the 
major demographic factors, along with measures of basic ideological orientation, and a 'conflict 
avoidance index' which Mutz (2006) argues is of widespread relevance, in that many people dislike 
politics because of their instinctive desire to avoid the conflict and noise that surrounds it. This is likely 
to be pertinent because stealth democrats, with their low interest in politics and disdain for politicians, 
can be expected to be generally conflict-avoidant, while dissatisfied democrats, with their interest in 
engagement and debate, are more likely to accept the inevitability of political conflict.
6
 We can 
immediately see that, where they are significant, each of the independent variables connects with the 
two dependent variables in inverse ways. That is, conflict-avoidance relates positively to stealth 
democracy, but negatively to dissatisfied democracy; those on the left ideologically are more likely to 
have stealth democratic orientations, while those on the right are more likely to have a dissatisfied 
democratic profile; women are significantly more likely to be stealth democratic, while men are more 
likely to be dissatisfied democratic; those of lower occupational class are more likely to be stealth 
democrats, while those of higher occupational class are more likely to be dissatisfied democrats; and 
those who score highly on stealth democracy are likely to have left full-time education relatively early, 
while those scoring highly on dissatisfied democracy will have stayed in education longer. In addition, 
stealth democrats are more likely to be social authoritarians than social liberals, while the older a 
respondent is, the more likely they are to be dissatisfied democrats. In short, stealth democrats are 
generally left of centre, socially authoritarian, female, lower social grade, less well-educated, and 
conflict-avoidant; dissatisfied democrats are the opposite on most of these counts. All of this is 
                                                 
6 The conflict avoidance index is an additive scale comprised of the following statements: I would rather not justify 
my political beliefs to someone who disagrees with me; I do not take it personally when someone disagrees with my 
political views; When I'm in a group, I often go along with what the majority decides is best, even if it is not what I want 
personally; When I'm in a group, I stand my ground even if everyone else disagrees with me; When people argue about 
politics, I often feel uncomfortable; I have no problem revealing my political beliefs, even to someone who would disagree 
with me. The scale has a theoretical range running from 6 (low conflict-avoidance) to 30 (high conflict-avoidance), with a 
scale mean of 17.7, suggesting that the majority of our sample are actually not overly concerned to avoid conflict. The 
reliability of the index is confirmed by a high Alpha score of .743. 
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consistent with the expectations set out in H1.
7
 
 
Table 3: OLS Models of Stealth Democratic and Dissatisfied Democratic Orientations 
 
Independent variable Standardized coefficients (significance) 
 Stealth democracy Dissatisfied democracy 
Conflict avoidance  .132 (.000) -.371 (.000) 
Left-Right ideology -.129 (.000)  .098 (.000) 
Liberty-Authority ideology -.128 (.000) n.s. 
Age n.s.  .116 (.000) 
Gender .133 (.000) -.176 (.000) 
Social grade .082 (.005) -.052 (.057) 
Terminal age of education -.163 (.000)  .213 (.000) 
Adjusted R2 for model .150 (n=1173) .257 (n=1174) 
 
 
 
Stealth democracy, dissatisfied democracy and political participation 
But what does all this signify for attitudes towards political participation? As a general rule, we would 
expect dissatisfied democrats, with their 'passion for the democratic creed', to be far keener on all forms 
of political participation than stealth democrats, although the latter should not be thought of as entirely 
averse to participation: at the very least they should feel driven to participate if they regard it as a 
possible means of keeping the political elites that they mistrust 'honest'. But what do we mean by 
'participation'? In this article, I will distinguish between three main variants of participation: 
deliberative democracy, 'orthodox' participation, and referendum democracy. It is common for theorists 
of deliberative democracy to argue that it is not simply synonymous with 'participatory democracy'; 
rather, it is a particular form of participation which entails the active engagement of participants in 
reasoned political discussion. As Carole Pateman (2012: 8) says of deliberative democracy, 'individuals 
                                                 
7 Analysis of residual diagnostics confirms that none of the key assumptions of OLS (linearity, homoscedasticity, no 
multicollinearity or autcorrelation) are violated in any of the models reported in this article. Details available from author on 
request. 
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should always be prepared to defend their moral and political arguments and claims with reasons, and 
be prepared to deliberate with others about the reasons they provide'. In addition, it is important and 
interesting to distinguish referendum democracy as a particular type in its own right because of its 
significance for populist and demagogic forms of politics. Government by direct democracy can be a 
way of bypassing the normal channels of representative politics without requiring much active 
involvement of ordinary citizens beyond a simple yes or no vote on a matter of policy. It is a favourite 
device of the anti-establishment populist organizations (including UKIP and the BNP in the UK) which 
contend that mainstream parties somehow betray the people they are supposed to represent. By 
contrast, there are many forms of participation that we might regard as part and parcel of the now 
'orthodox' repertoire of activity in representative democracy, especially party and electoral politics, and 
interest group activity. In this article, each of these three variants of political participation – deliberative 
democracy, referendum democracy and 'orthodox' (representative) participation – is tested as a 
dependent variable. More precisely, the respondents' hypothetical willingness to deliberate or 
participate, and their general preference for direct democracy, are regressed on explanatory models that 
incorporate stealth democratic orientation, dissatisfied democratic orientation, tendency to avoid 
conflict and the main ideological and demographic variables.
8
 The purpose is to further bolster the 
                                                 
8 Willingness to participate in 'orthodox' ways in the political system is measured by an additive scale constructed 
from the following attitudinal questions: Would you  be willing to: Vote in a local, national or European election? Become a 
member of a political party? Hold office in a local or national pressure group or organization? Hold local or national party 
office? Contact a local councillor, members of a devolved assembly, MP or MEP about an issue of concern to you? Sign a 
public petition regarding a national or local political issue? Take part in a public demonstration about an issue of concern to 
you? Donate money to a party or other political organization? Write a letter to a newspaper editor? Take an active part in a 
political campaign about an issue of concern to you? Campaign on behalf of a candidate for local, national, devolved or 
European election? Be a candidate for an elective post at local, devolved, UK or European levels? Go to a political meeting? 
Boycott or buy certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons? The scale has a theoretical range running 
from 14 (low willingness to participate) to 28 (high willingness to participate), with a scale mean of 17.82 (confirming the 
general unwillingness of respondents to participate). Alpha = .861, indicating good reliability. Willingness to deliberate is 
measured by a variable called 'willingdeliberate' which is a scale derived loosely from the work of Neblo et al (2010). It is 
constructed from pooled responses to four slightly different variants of a question about hypothetical willingness to take part 
in deliberative exercises that were asked of different randomly selected sub-samples of the data set. These variants asked 
respondents: If you were ever to have the chance of participating in a one-day session where citizens discuss important 
issues with their local MPs or councillors (for/without a £30 reward), how interested do you think you would be? If you 
were ever to have the chance of participating in a one-hour online session where citizens discuss important issues with their 
local MPs or councillors (for/without a £30 reward), how interested do you think you would be? Respondents answering 
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testing of H1. To this point in the argument, I have sought to demonstrate that stealth democratic and 
dissatisfied democratic orientations do indeed exist in the electorate, but have done so without checking 
if these basic attitudinal profiles have their corollaries, as one would imagine they should, in feelings 
about political participation. It is to be expected that those who score highly on the dissatisfied 
democracy scale will be eager to take part in any form of political participation, whether it is part and 
parcel of the normal process of representative democracy, direct democracy or deliberative in nature; 
by contrast, we would clearly expect those registering high scores on the stealth democracy scale to be 
far less willing to declare a preference for either orthodox or deliberative political participation. 
However, it is not so certain that they would be opposed to direct democracy, for there is much in the 
stealth democratic profile which is intrinsically populist. The stealth democrat is not greatly interested 
in politics, has little understanding of or patience with its inherent messiness, complexity, 
adversarialism and frequent need for apparently sub-optimal compromises, and has low regard for 
political elites in general: while s/he might not have much inclination to get involved in political 
activity, it is quite conceivable that political actors who hold such views would be drawn to the idea 
that the ordinary and virtuous people should be able to take decision-making power out of the hands of 
elites through recourse to referendums.       
 
One would expect that those who are highly conflict-avoidant would generally be disinclined to  
engage in political activity that involves face-to-face interaction or is plainly adversarial. These 
considerations would lead one to hypothesize that respondents scoring highly on the conflict-avoidance 
index will generally score low on willingness to deliberate or undertake orthodox political 
participation. Attitude towards referendum democracy is harder to predict: on the one hand, a 
                                                                                                                                                                       
'very interested' to any of these variants of the questions were coded 4, while those answering 'quite interested' were coded 
3, those opting for 'not very interested' were coded 2, and those for 'not at all interested' were coded 1. The scale mean is 
2.75 (n=1209). Orientation towards direct democracy is measured by response to the statement: 'Referendums are a good 
way to decide important political questions', where 5 = strongly agree, 4 = tend to agree, 3 = neither agree/nor disagree, 2 = 
tend to disagree, and 1 = strongly disagree (scale mean = 3.67, n=1223). 
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referendum campaign could be adversarial and conflictual; on the other hand, there is little need for 
direct engagement with others. It is possible for citizens to spectate without participating until the 
moment of visiting the polling booth. My somewhat tentative hypothesis, then, would be for a less 
strongly negative relationship between conflict avoidance and referendum democracy than between 
conflict-avoidance and the other forms of participation. Finally, while I have no clear expectations 
about the relationships between left-right ideology or liberty-authority and any of these forms of 
participation, I include them in the models along with the demographic variables in order to control for 
their effects: without such controls, there is a risk of over-estimating the impact of stealth and 
dissatisfied democratic attitudes on one or more forms of political participation. 
 Table 4 reports the results of these three models of political participation. Close examination 
reveals that the expectations set out in the previous paragraph are largely borne out. The higher a 
respondent's stealth orientation, the less they are willing to deliberate or participate – but, as 
hypothesized, the situation is different with regard to referendum democracy. In fact, the relationship 
between stealth and direct democracy is non-significant, but even this makes for a substantively 
interesting contrast with the other two forms of participation. There is clearly a degree of ambiguity 
about the stealth democratic  attitude towards direct democracy, which suggests there is something to 
the argument that stealth democracy carries undertones of populism. By contrast, the higher a 
respondent's score on the dissatisfied democracy index, the more willing they are to deliberate, 
participate, or rate referendums highly. These are are all significant relationships. And the more a 
respondent prefers to avoid conflict, the less they wish to deliberate, participate or favour referendums 
– all significant relationships (though only at the 10% level for the last of these). Moreover, as 
predicted, conflict-avoidance does indeed relate less weakly to referendums than to either deliberation 
or participation.  
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Table 4: OLS Models of Different Forms of Political Participation 
 
Independent variable Standardized coefficients (significance) 
  
Deliberative democracy 
  
Orthodox participation 
 
Referendum democracy  
Stealth democracy -.140 (.000) -.205 (.000) n.s 
Dissatisfied dem.  .255 (.000) .294 (.000) .226 (.000) 
Conflict avoidance -.179 (.000) -.231(.000) -.053 (.086) 
Left-Right Ideology n.s n.s. n.s. 
Liberty-Authority ideology n.s .086 (.000) -.275 (.000) 
Age -.060 (.048) .060 (.020) n.s 
Gender n.s. n.s. n.s 
Social grade -.085 (.004) -.114 (.000) n.s 
Terminal age of education n.s .090 (.001) n.s 
Adjusted R2 for model .216 (n=1103) .406 (n=1174) .124 (n=1173) 
 
 
What of the ideological and demographic predictors? While these are not of central interest in this 
paper, it is important to control for their influence, of course. None of them is universally significant 
across all three of the models; indeed, neither left-right ideology nor gender is significant for any of 
them. The remaining factors are significant for at least one of the models, however. Thus, orthodox 
participation is positively associated with social liberalism, while a preference for direct democracy is 
associated with social authoritarianism (a further indication of the populist connotations of 
referendums). Older respondents are more likely to score highly on the orthodox participation index, 
but lower on deliberative democracy; occupational class makes no difference to referendum attitudes, 
but the lower a respondent's class, the less likely they are either to want to deliberate or participate; and 
while education does not impact significantly on attitude towards direct democracy or deliberation, it 
does makes respondents significantly more likely to favour orthodox participation. None of these 
findings should be cause for surprise. In particular, it has long been known that social class and 
education are positive correlates of political participation, so we would certainly expect to find that 
higher class and better educated individuals are generally keener on participating, even when holding 
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all other factors constant. 
 
Is it possible that the particular form of deliberation could change the findings regarding willingness to 
deliberate? 'Deliberation' is a broad term which takes in a host of different forms of political 
engagement and it is conceivable that people would be more interested in some types of deliberative 
exercise than others. Adapting an idea first devised by Neblo and his colleagues (2010), it is possible to 
go some way towards investigating this proposition through a simple experiment. The sample was split 
into four randomly selected sub-samples, each of which was asked a slightly different version of the 
question about their willingness to participate in deliberative consultations with elected representatives. 
The basic form of the question directed to respondents was 'If you were ever to have the chance of 
participating in a session where citizens discuss important issues with their local MPs or councillors, 
how interested do you think you would be?' However, while half of the respondents were asked a 
version of the question that suggested such sessions would last for a full-day (implicitly through face-
to-face interaction), the other half were given a version that proposed a model of engagement involving 
a one-hour online interaction. Moreover, each half was further sub-divided between those who were 
offered a payment of £30 for their participation, and those to whom no mention of financial inducement 
was made. We can use the separate responses of the four sub-samples to gauge whether these variations 
make a significant difference to the willingness of citizens to deliberate with their elected 
representatives. Table 5 reports the simple frequency counts across the four variant sub-samples on 
these questions, and suggests two basic conclusions. First, the financial incentive helps! About two-
thirds of respondents are willing to take part in deliberative exercises, whether face-to-face or online, if 
they are paid a small inducement to do so (Variants A & C). Second, if a financial reward is not 
provided, then the one-hour online variant (Variant D) is a little more likely to attract participants than 
the all-day encounter (Variant C) with elected representatives. 
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Table 5: Impact of variations in exercise on willingness to deliberate 
 
 Variant A Variant B Variant C Variant D 
Very 
interested 
25.9  
 
= 67.0 
11  
 
= 45.0 
29.4  
 
= 65.2 
10.9  
 
= 52.4 
Quite 
interested 
41.1 34 35.8 41.5 
Not very 
interested 
11.6  
 
= 29.7 
11.6  
 
= 40.7 
8.4  
 
= 26.8 
11.8  
 
= 36.4 
Not at all 
interested 
18.1 29.1 18.4 24.6 
Don't know 3.3 n=305 14.3 n=325 8.1 n=360 11.2 n=365 
 
Variant A: If you were ever to have the chance of participating in a one-day session where citizens discuss important issues 
with their local MPs or councillors for a £30 reward, how interested do you think you would be?  
Variant B: If you were ever to have the chance of participating in a one-day session where citizens discuss important issues 
with their local MPs or councillors, how interested do you think you would be?  
Variant C: If you were ever to have the chance of participating in a one-hour online session where citizens discuss important 
issues with their local MPs or councillors for a £30 reward, how interested do you think you would be?  
Variant D: If you were ever to have the chance of participating in a one-hour online session where citizens discuss important 
issues with their local MPs or councillors, how interested do you think you would be?  
 
 
Table 6: OLS Models of Willingness to Participate in Different Variants of Deliberation  
 
Independent variable Standardized coefficients (significance) 
 Variant A Variant B Variant C Variant D 
Stealth democracy n.s -.151 (.010) -.104 (.071) -.185 (.005) 
Dissatisfied democracy .356 (.000) .327 (.000) .262 (.000) .169 (.012) 
Conflict avoidance -.106  (.095) -.169 (.002) -.277 (.000) -.166 (.005) 
Left-Right Ideology n.s n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Liberty-Authority ideology n.s n.s n.s. n.s. 
Age -.192 (.006) n.s -.131 (.018) n.s. 
Gender n.s. -.096 (.069) n.s. n.s. 
Social grade n.s. n.s -.111 (.032) n.s. 
Terminal age of education n.s. n.s n.s. n.s. 
Adjusted R2 for model .193 (n=254) .338 (n=281) .281(n=321) .148 (n=317) 
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What difference, if any, do these variations in the way the deliberative exercise is framed make to the 
results of the OLS model of a respondent's willingness to deliberate? Table 6 confirms that the effect of 
stealth democratic orientation is weakest when financial inducements are offered: indeed, it becomes 
completely non-significant for Variant A (the full-day face-to-face scenario) and is only significant at 
the 10% level for Variant C (the one-hour online scenario). When payment is not offered, the stealth 
democratic mindset constitutes a slightly greater obstacle to deliberative engagement. All this suggests 
that money might be a way through which those who generally prefer not to participate could be 
persuaded to take part in civic and political life - a somewhat cynical but powerful message for policy-
makers to consider. Finally, we should note that dissatisfied democratic orientation and conflict-
avoidance remain significant under any of the four scenarios, while left-right and liberty-authority 
ideological orientations lose any significant impact when the model is disaggregated in this way, as 
does education.  
 
 
Discussion: Implications for the potential of deliberative democracy 
The findings reported here constitute broad confirmation of H1, which simply states that there are two 
quite different types of attitude prevalent among citizens who are ‘disaffected’ with politics: the 
‘dissatisfied democrat’ and ‘stealth democrat’ orientations. The presence of the former is greater than 
that of the latter in the British adult population, and we have seen that the demographic and attitudinal 
correlates of these two distinctive orientations towards democracy differ notably, and that while the 
former are enthusiasts for all forms of political participation, the latter are far less keen. That said, 
stealth democrats are more ambiguous about the idea of direct democracy. To this extent, the British 
sample resembles the Finnish data reported by Bengtsson and Mattila, who noted that many people 
'prefer simultaneously both more direct democracy and more stealth democracy' (2009: 1045). While 
they concede that these things are 'perhaps not logically mutually exclusive', they argue that direct 
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democracy and stealth democracy clearly represent different democratic ideals insofar as one 'stresses 
direct citizen involvement while the other puts emphasis on efficiency and expert decision-making'. 
Although this is true, I would suggest that it understates the extent to which direct democracy and 
stealth democracy are logically compatible, since both are pertinent to the populist world-view. It is not 
referendums that stealth democrats shy away from so much as other forms of political participation, 
both mainstream and deliberative. 
 
It should be noted that the findings reported in this article do not carry any direct ramifications for the 
second hypothesis referred to, that deliberative participation would at best only be effective in respect 
of the dissatisfied democrats, but would be counter-productive with respect to the stealth democrats. 
Investigation of H2 is a matter for further research, but it is may be useful to conclude with a few 
reflections on the question. It is important to note that proponents of deliberative democracy might well 
concede that H1 could hold without accepting that H2 must follow. They can acknowledge the current 
empirical reality of the unwillingness of many citizens, especially those of lower socio-economic class 
and educational experience, to countenance political engagement, while maintaining that this owes 
something to the mobilizational shortcomings of existing systems of representative democracy. It is 
only when such citizens, the argument goes, are actually presented with the opportunity to take part in 
meaningful political deliberation that they become inspired to develop political interest, knowledge and 
a new sense of political efficacy. It is the deliberative experience that generates civic commitment and 
activism. While the evidence in support of such a contention is somewhat mixed (Delli Carpini et al 
2004), there is undoubtedly some that is favourable: '...ordinary citizens, given some information and 
time for discussion in groups of diverse opinions, are quite capable of understanding complex, and 
sometimes technical, issues and reaching pertinent conclusions about significant public matters' 
(Pateman 2012: 9; see also Fournier et al 2011 for an interesting recent illustration of this point). It is 
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not the purpose of this article to engage seriously with such claims, although it is interesting to note 
that some of the findings from exploratory work I previously conducted with colleagues is consistent 
with them. This was a pilot study involving focus group deliberations by participants who had been 
selected according to our hypothesized profiles of stealth and dissatisfied democrats. Although the 
findings were necessarily tentative, we concluded that 'there is no obvious sign that those we defined as 
stealth democrats derived any less enjoyment from the deliberative exercise than their dissatisfied 
democrat counterparts, nor that their sense of political efficacy or self-confidence suffered for the 
experience... those we designated stealth democrats do not appear to have been turned off from political 
participation by their experience in these focus group exercises' (Webb et al 2010: 43). It is clear, then, 
that the major questions that remain in respect of this field of scholarship concern the identification of 
forms of deliberation that will work and articulate successfully with existing institutions in 'the real 
world of democracy'.  
27 
 
 
References 
 
Ackerman, Bruce & James S. Fishkin (2004) Deliberation Day (New Haven: Yale University Press) 
 
Bengtsson, Asa and Miko Mattila (2009) 'Direct democracy and its critics: Support for direct 
democracy and stealth democracy in Finland' West European Politics, 32/5: 1031-1048. 
 
Bellamy, Richard (2007) ‘Republicanism, Democracy and Constitutionalism’ in C. Laborde and J. 
Maynar (eds.) Republicanism and Political Theory (Oxford: Blackwell). 
 
Bessette, Joseph (1980) ‘Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Principle in Republican Government’, 
in How Democractic is the Constitution? (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press), pp. 102-116.  
 
Cohen, Joshua (1989) ‘Deliberative Democracy and Democratic Legitimacy’, from A. Hamlin and P. 
Pettit (eds), The Good Polity. (Oxford: Blackwell), pp. 17-34. 
 
Council of Europe (2009) Electronic democracy: Recommendation CM/Rec(2009)1 and explanatory 
memorandum (2009) (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing). 
 
Dalton, Russell J. (2004) Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political 
Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 
Delli Carpini, Michael X., Fay Lomax Cook & Lawrence R. Jacobs (2004) 'Public deliberation, 
discursive participation and citizen engagement: A review of the empirical literature', Annual Review of 
Political Science, 7: 315-344. 
 
Fishkin, James S. (1991) Democracy and Deliberation (New Haven: Yale University Press). 
 
Fournier, Patrick, Henk van der Kolk, R. Kenneth Carty, Andre Blais & Jonathan Rose (2011) When 
Citizens Decide: Lessons from Citizen Assemblies on Electoral Reform (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press). 
 
Goodwin, Barbara (2005) Justice by Lottery (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2
nd
 edition). 
 
Heath, A, Evans, G & Martin, J (1993) `The measurement of core beliefs and values: The development 
of balanced socialist/laissez faire and libertarian/authoritarian scales' British Journal of Political 
Science 24: 115-58. 
 
Hibbing, John and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2002) Stealth Democracy: Americans’ Beliefs About How 
Government Should Work (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
James, Clive (2009) A Point of View, BBC Radio 4, broadcast 4.12.09 (available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006qng8) 
 
McCubbins, Matthew and Schwartz, Thomas (1984) ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols versus Fire Alarm’, American Journal of Political Science, 28:1, 165-179. 
 
Morrell, Michael E. (1999) 'Citizens' Evaluations of Participatory Democratic Procedures: Normative 
28 
 
Theory Meets Empirical Science' Political Research Quarterly, 52/2, pp. 293-322  
 
Mutz, Diana C. (2006) Hearing the Other Side: Deliberative versus Participatory Democracy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Neblo, Michael,  Kevin M. Esterling, Ryan P. Kennedy, David Lazer, Anand E. Sokhey (2009) Who 
Wants to Deliberate – and Why? (Cambridge Mass: Harvard Working Paper RWP09-027, September). 
 
Nino, C.S. (1996) The Constitution of Deliberative Democracy. (New Haven: Yale University Press). 
 
Pateman, Carole (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press). 
 
Pateman, Carole (2012) 'Participatory democracy revisited' Perspectives on Politics, 10 (1): 7-20. 
 
Power Inquiry (2006) Power to the People: The Report of Power, an Independent Inquiry into Britain’s 
Democracy (London: Power Inquiry). 
 
Schudson, M. (1999). The Good Citizen: A History of American Civic Life. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press).  
 
Webb, Paul, Tim Bale and Paul Taggart (2010) 'Deliberative versus Parliamentary Democracy in the 
UK: An Experimental Study' SEI Working Paper 118 (Sussex: Sussex European Institute).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies 
 
 
1. Vesna Bojicic and David Dyker  June 1993 
 Sanctions on Serbia: Sledgehammer or Scalpel 
 
2. Gunther Burghardt  August 1993 
 The Future for a European Foreign and Security Policy 
 
3. Xiudian Dai, Alan Cawson, Peter Holmes  February 1994 
 Competition, Collaboration & Public Policy: A Case Study of the 
 European HDTV Strategy 
 
4. Colin Crouch  February 1994 
 The Future of Unemployment in Western Europe? Reconciling Demands 
  for Flexibility, Quality and Security 
 
5. John Edmonds  February 1994 
 Industrial Relations - Will the European Community Change Everything? 
 
6. Olli Rehn  July 1994 
 The European Community and the Challenge of a Wider Europe 
 
7. Ulrich Sedelmeier October 1994 
 The EU’s Association Policy towards Central Eastern Europe: Political 
  and Economic Rationales in Conflict 
 
8. Mary Kaldor February 1995 
 Rethinking British Defence Policy and Its Economic Implications 
 
9. Alasdair Young December 1994 
 Ideas, Interests and Institutions: The Politics of Liberalisation in the 
  EC’s Road Haulage Industry 
 
10. Keith Richardson December 1994 
 Competitiveness in Europe: Cooperation or Conflict? 
 
11. Mike Hobday June 1995 
 The Technological Competence of European Semiconductor Producers 
 
12. Graham Avery July 1995 
 The Commission’s Perspective on the Enlargement Negotiations 
 
13. Gerda Falkner September 1995 
 The Maastricht Protocol on Social Policy: Theory and Practice 
 
14. Vesna Bojicic, Mary Kaldor, Ivan Vejvoda November 1995 
30 
 
 Post-War Reconstruction in the Balkans 
 
15. Alasdair Smith, Peter Holmes, Ulrich Sedelmeier,                   March 1996 
 Edward Smith, Helen Wallace, Alasdair Young 
 The European Union and Central and Eastern Europe: Pre-Accession 
             Strategies   
 
16. Helen Wallace March 1996 
 From an Island off the North-West Coast of Europe 
 
17. Indira Konjhodzic June 1996 
 Democratic Consolidation of the Political System in Finland, 1945-1970:  
 Potential Model for the New States of Central and Eastern Europe? 
 
18. Antje Wiener and Vince Della Sala December 1996 
 Constitution Making and Citizenship Practice - Bridging the Democracy 
 Gap in the EU?  
 
19. Helen Wallace and Alasdair Young December 1996 
 Balancing Public and Private Interests Under Duress 
 
20. S. Ran Kim April 1997 
 Evolution of Governance & the Growth Dynamics of the Korean 
 Semiconductor Industry 
 
21. Tibor Navracsics June 1997 
 A Missing Debate?: Hungary and the European Union 
 
22. Peter Holmes with Jeremy Kempton September 1997 
 Study on the Economic and Industrial Aspects of Anti-Dumping Policy 
 
23. Helen Wallace January 1998 
 Coming to Terms with a Larger Europe: Options for Economic 
  Integration 
 
24. Mike Hobday, Alan Cawson and S Ran Kim January 1998 
 The Pacific Asian Electronics Industries: Technology Governance 
 and Implications for Europe 
 
25. Iain Begg August 1998 
 Structural Fund Reform in the Light of Enlargement 
 CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 1 
 
26. Mick Dunford and Adrian Smith August 1998  
 Trajectories of Change in Europe’s Regions: Cohesion, 
 Divergence and Regional Performance 
 CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 2 
 
31 
 
27. Ray Hudson August 1998 
 What Makes Economically Successful Regions in Europe Successful? 
 Implications for Transferring Success from West to East 
 CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 3 
 
28. Adam Swain August 1998 
 Institutions and Regional Development: Evidence from Hungary and  
 Ukraine 
 CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 4 
 
29. Alasdair Young October 1998 
 Interpretation and ‘Soft Integration’ in the Adaptation of the European 
 Community’s Foreign Economic Policy 
 CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 5 
 
30. Rilka Dragneva March 1999 
 Corporate Governence Through Privatisation: Does Design Matter? 
 
31. Christopher Preston and Arkadiusz Michonski March 1999 
 Negotiating Regulatory Alignment in Central Europe: The Case of the 
 Poland EU European Conformity Assessment Agreement 
 
32. Jeremy Kempton, Peter Holmes, Cliff Stevenson September 1999 
 Globalisation of Anti-Dumping and the EU 
 CENTRE ON EUROPEAN POLITICAL ECONOMY Working Paper No. 6 
 
33. Alan Mayhew March 2000 
 Financial and Budgetary Implications of the Accession of Central 
  and East European Countries to the European Union.   
 
34. Aleks Szczerbiak May 2000 
Public Opinion and Eastward Enlargement - Explaining Declining  
Support for EU Membership in Poland 
 
35. Keith Richardson September 2000 
 Big Business and the European Agenda 
 
36. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart October 2000 
 Opposing Europe: Party Systems and Opposition to the Union, the Euro 
  and Europeanisation 
 OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 1 
 
37. Alasdair Young, Peter Holmes and Jim Rollo November 2000 
 The European Trade Agenda After Seattle 
 
38.   Sławomir Tokarski and Alan Mayhew            December 2000 
  Impact Assessment and European Integration Policy 
 
32 
 
39.   Alan Mayhew        December 2000 
 Enlargement of the European Union: an Analysis of the Negotiations 
 with the Central and Eastern European Candidate Countries 
 
40.  Pierre Jacquet and Jean Pisani-Ferry      January 2001 
 Economic Policy Co-ordination in the Eurozone: What has been achieved?   
 What should be done? 
 
41. Joseph F. Francois and Machiel Rombout       February 2001 
 Trade Effects From The Integration Of The Central And East European  
 Countries Into The European Union 
 
42. Peter Holmes and Alasdair Young        February 2001 
 Emerging Regulatory Challenges to the EU's External Economic Relations 
 
43. Michael Johnson          March 2001 
 EU Enlargement and Commercial Policy:  Enlargement and the Making 
 of Commercial Policy 
 
44. Witold Orłowski and Alan Mayhew           May 2001 
 The Impact of EU Accession on Enterprise, Adaptation and Institutional 
  Development in the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe 
 
45. Adam Lazowski            May 2001 
 Adaptation of the Polish legal system to European Union law: Selected aspects 
 
46. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak           May 2001 
 Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate  
 States of Central and Eastern Europe 
 OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 2 
 
47.  Paul Webb and Justin Fisher            May 2001 
 Professionalizing the Millbank Tendency: the Political Sociology of New 
 Labour's Employees 
 
48.  Aleks Szczerbiak           June 2001 
 Europe as a Re-aligning Issue in Polish Politics?: Evidence from 
 the October 2000 Presidential Election 
 OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 3 
 
49.  Agnes Batory          September 2001  
 Hungarian Party Identities and the Question of European Integration 
 OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 4 
 
50.  Karen Henderson          September 2001 
 Euroscepticism or Europhobia: Opposition attitudes to the EU in the 
 Slovak Republic 
 OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 5 
33 
 
 
51.  Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak   April 2002 
 The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States 
 OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 6. 
 
52.  Alan Mayhew   April 2002 
 The Negotiating Position of the European Union on Agriculture, the 
 Structural Funds and the EU Budget. 
 
53.  Aleks Szczerbiak   May 2002 
 After the Election, Nearing The Endgame: The Polish Euro-Debate in 
 the Run Up To The 2003 EU Accession Referendum 
 OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 7. 
 
54.  Charlie Lees   June 2002 
'Dark Matter': institutional constraints and the failure of party-based 
 Euroscepticism in Germany 
OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 8  
 
55. Pinar Tanlak      October 2002  
Turkey EU Relations in the Post Helsinki phase and the EU 
harmonisation laws adopted by the Turkish Grand National Assembly 
in August 2002 
 
56. Nick Sitter                                                                                       October 2002  
 Opposing Europe: Euro-Scepticism, Opposition and Party Competition 
 OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 9 
 
57. Hans G. Nilsson   November 2002 
 Decision Making in EU Justice and Home Affairs: Current Shortcomings 
and Reform Possibilities 
 
58. Adriano Giovannelli   November 2002 
 Semipresidentialism: an emerging pan-European model 
 
59. Daniel Naurin   December 2002 
 Taking Transparency Seriously 
 
60. Lucia Quaglia       March 2003 
Euroscepticism in Italy and centre Right and Right wing political parties 
 OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 10 
 
61. Francesca Vassallo       March 2003 
 Another Europeanisation Case: British Political Activism  
 
62. Kieran Williams, Aleks Szczerbiak, Brigid Fowler        March 2003 
 Explaining Lustration in Eastern Europe: a Post-Communist Politics  
 Approach   
34 
 
 
63. Rasa Spokeviciute          March 2003 
 The Impact of EU Membership of The Lithuanian Budget 
 
64. Clive Church               May 2003 
 The Contexts of Swiss Opposition to Europe  
 OPPOSING EUROPE RESEARCH NETWORK Working Paper No. 11 
 
65. Alan Mayhew                May 2003 
 The Financial and Budgetary Impact of Enlargement and Accession 
 
66. Przemysław Biskup             June 2003  
Conflicts Between Community and National Laws: An Analysis of the  
British Approach 
 
67. Eleonora Crutini       August 2003 
 Evolution of Local Systems in the Context of Enlargement 
 
68. Professor Jim Rollo       August 2003 
 Agriculture, the Structural Funds and the Budget After Enlargement 
 
69. Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart           October 2003 
 Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of Definition,  
Measurement and Causality 
 EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
 No. 12 
 
70. Nicolo Conti             November 2003 
 Party Attitudes to European Integration: A Longitudinal Analysis of the 
Italian Case 
 EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
No. 13 
 
71. Paul Lewis       November 2003 
 The Impact of the Enlargement of the European Union on Central 
              European Party Systems 
 EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper 
 No. 14 
 
72. Jonathan P. Aus   December 2003 
 Supranational Governance in an “Area of Freedom, Security and  
 Justice”: Eurodac and the Politics of Biometric Control 
  
73. Juraj Buzalk                                                                                     February 2004 
 Is Rural Populism on the decline? Continuities and Changes in  
 Twentieth Century Europe: The case of Slovakia 
 
74.  Anna Slodka      May 2004 
35 
 
 Eco Labelling in the EU: Lessons for Poland 
 
75. Pasquale Tridico            May 2004 
 Institutional Change and Economic Performance in Transition 
 Economics: The case of Poland 
 
76. Arkadiusz Domagala               August 2004 
Humanitarian Intervention: The Utopia of Just War?  
The NATO intervention in Kosovo and the restraints of Humanitarian Intervention 
 
77.  Marisol Garcia, Antonio Cardesa Salzmann &Marc Pradel      September 2004 
 The European Employment Strategy: An Example of European 
Multi-level Governance 
 
78.  Alan Mayhew          October 2004  
 The Financial Framework of the European Union, 2007–2013: New  
 Policies? New Money? 
 
79.  Wojciech Lewandowski            October 2004 
 The Influence of the War in Iraq on Transatlantic Relations 
 
80.  Susannah Verney           October 2004  
The End of Socialist Hegemony: Europe and the Greek Parliamentary  
Election of 7
th
 March 2004 
 EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
 No. 15 
 
81. Kenneth Chan   November 2004  
Central and Eastern Europe in the 2004 European Parliamentary 
             Elections: A Not So European Event 
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
No. 16 
 
82.   Lionel Marquis           December 2004  
 The Priming of Referendum Votes on Swiss European Policy 
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
No. 17 
 
83.   Lionel Marquis and Karin Gilland Lutz        December 2004  
Thinking About and Voting on Swiss Foreign Policy: Does Affective  
and Cognitive Involvement Play a Role?  
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
No. 18 
 
84.  Nathaniel Copsey and Aleks Szczerbiak         March 2005 
The Future of Polish-Ukrainian Relations: Evidence from the June 2004 
            European Parliament Election Campaign in Poland 
  
36 
 
85. Ece Ozlem Atikcan                    May 2006  
 Citizenship or Denizenship: The Treatment of Third Country Nationals  
in the European Union   
 
86.   Aleks Szczerbiak                    May 2006 
‘Social Poland’ Defeats ‘Liberal Poland’?: The September-October 2005 
 Polish Parliamentary and Presidential Elections 
 
87. Nathaniel Copsey             October 2006 
 Echoes of the Past in Contemporary Politics: the case of  
Polish-Ukrainian Relations  
 
88. Lyukba Savkova           November 2006 
Spoilt for Choice, Yet Hard to Get: Voters and Parties at the Bulgarian  
2005 Parliamentary Election  
 
89. Tim Bale and Paul Taggart                     November 2006 
First Timers Yes, Virgins No: The Roles and Backgrounds 
 of New Members of the European Parliament  
 
90. Lucia Quaglia           November 2006 
             Setting the pace? Private financial interests and European financial 
             market integration  
 
91. Tim Bale and Aleks Szczerbiak        December 2006 
Why is there no Christian Democracy in Poland  
(and why does this matter)?  
 
92. Edward Phelps            December 2006  
Young Adults and Electoral Turnout in Britain: Towards a Generational 
Model of Political Participation 
 
93.   Alan Mayhew                   April 2007 
A certain idea of Europe: Can European integration survive  
eastern enlargement? 
             
94 . Seán Hanley, Aleks Szczerbiak, Tim Haughton          May 2007 
and Brigid Fowler   
Explaining the Success of Centre-Right Parties in Post-Communist 
East Central Europe: A Comparative Analysis 
 
95. Dan Hough and Michael Koß                           May 2007 
Territory and Electoral Politics in Germany 
 
96. Lucia Quaglia                    July 2007 
Committee Governance in the Financial Sector in the European Union 
 
37 
 
97. Lucia Quaglia, Dan Hough and Alan Mayhew                          August 2007 
You Can’t Always Get What You Want, But Do You Sometimes Get  
What You Need? The German Presidency of the EU in 2007 
 
98.   Aleks Szczerbiak                              November 2007  
  Why do Poles love the EU and what do they love about it?: Polish  
  attitudes towards European integration  during the first three years 
     of EU membership  
 
99.       Francis McGowan                   January 2008 
 The Contrasting Fortunes of European Studies and EU Studies: Grounds  
 for Reconciliation?  
 
100. Aleks Szczerbiak                     January 2008 
The birth of a bi-polar party system or a referendum on a polarising  
government: The October 2007 Polish parliamentary election  
 
101.     Catharina Sørensen                      January 2008 
  Love me, love me not… A typology of public euroscepticism 
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
 No. 19 
 
102. Lucia Quaglia                    February 2008 
 Completing the Single Market in Financial services: An Advocacy 
             Coalition Framework 
 
103.  Aleks Szczerbiak and Monika Bil             May 2008 
When in doubt, (re-)turn to domestic politics? 
The (non-) impact of the EU on party politics in Poland 
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
 No. 20 
 
104. John Palmer                                                                         July 2008 
     Beyond EU Enlargement-Creating a United European Commonwealth 
 
105. Paul Blokker            September 2008  
Constitutional Politics, Constitutional Texts and Democratic Variety in  
Central and Eastern Europe 
 
106. Edward Maxfield          September 2008    
A New Right for a New Europe?  Basescu, the Democrats & Romania’s centre-right 
 
 
107. Emanuele Massetti          November 2008 
The Scottish and Welsh Party Systems Ten Years after Devolution: Format, Ideological 
Polarization and Structure of Competition 
 
108.  Stefano Braghiroli            December 2008 
38 
 
Home Sweet Home: Assessing the Weight and Effectiveness  
of National Parties’ Interference on MEPs’ everyday Activity 
 
109. Christophe Hillion and Alan Mayhew               January 2009 
The Eastern Partnership – something new or window-dressing  
  
110. John FitzGibbon               September 2009 
Ireland’s No to Lisbon: Learning the Lessons from the 
failure of the Yes and the Success of the No Side 
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
 No. 21 
 
111. Emelie Lilliefeldt              September 2009 
Political parties and Gender Balanced Parliamentary Presence in Western Europe: A two-step 
Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
112. Valeria Tarditi                   January 2010 
THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY’S CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE EUROPEAN UNION 
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
 No. 22 
 
113. Stijn van Kessel               February 2010  
Swaying the disgruntled floating voter. The rise of populist parties in contemporary Dutch 
politics.  
 
114.     Peter Holmes and Jim Rollo                                April 2010 
 EU Internal Market: Shaping a new Commission Agenda 2009-2014. 
 
115. Alan Mayhew                     June 2010 
The Economic and Financial Crisis: impacts on an emerging economy – Ukraine 
 
116. Daniel Keith                        June 2010 
 The Portuguese Communist Party – Lessons in Resisting Change 
 
117. Ariadna Ripoll Servent                      June 2010 
The European Parliament and the ‘Returns’ directive: The end of radical contestation; the start 
of consensual constraints? 
 
118. Paul Webb, Tim Bale and Paul Taggart            October 2010 
Deliberative Versus Parliamentary Democracy in the UK: An Experimental Study  
 
119.     Alan Mayhew, Kai Oppermann and Dan Hough                April 2011  
German foreign policy and leadership of the EU – ‘You can’t always get what  
              you want … but you sometimes get what you need’  
 
120. Tim Houwen                       June 2011 
 The non-European roots of the concept of populism  
 
39 
 
121.      Cas Mudde                 August 2011 
 Sussex v. North Carolina: The Comparative Study of Party Based Euroscepticism 
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
 No. 23 
 
122.  Marko Stojic               August 2011 
The Changing Nature of Serbian Political Parties’ Attitudes Towards Serbian EU Membership  
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper  
 No. 24 
 
123.  Daniel Keith                      September 2011 
‘When life gives you lemons make lemonade’: Party organisation and the adaptation of West 
European Communist Parties 
 
124.  Marianne Sundlisæter Skinner           October 2011 
From Ambiguity to Euroscepticism? A Case Study of the Norwegian Progress Party’s Position 
on the European Union 
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper   
No. 25 
 
125. Amy Busby                                  October 2011 
“You’re not going to write about that are you?”: what methodological issues arise when doing 
ethnography in an elite political setting? 
 
126.     Robin Kolodny                                              November 2011 
The Bidirectional Benefits of Political Party Democracy Promotion: The Case of the UK’s 
Westminster Foundation for Democracy 
  
127. Tapio Raunio                              February 2012 
‘Whenever the EU is involved, you get problems’: Explaining the European policy of The 
(True) Finns  
EUROPEAN PARTIES ELECTIONS AND REFERENDUMS NETWORK Working Paper   
No. 26 
 
 128.  Alan Mayhew                   March 2012 
  Reforming the EU budget to support economic growth 
 
 129. Aleks Szczerbiak                  March 2012 
Poland (Mainly) Chooses Stability and Continuity: The October 2011 Polish Parliamentary 
Election  
 
130. Lee Savage        April 2012 
A product of their bargaining environment: Explaining government duration in Central and 
Eastern Europe 
 
131. Paul Webb        August 2012 
Who is willing to participate, and how? Dissatisfied democrats, stealth democrats and populists 
in the UK 
40 
 
 
All Working Papers are downloadable free of charge from the web - 
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/publications/seiworkingpapers. 
Otherwise, each Working Paper is £5.00 (unless noted otherwise) plus £1.00 postage and packing per 
copy in Europe and £2.00 per copy elsewhere. Payment by credit card or cheque (payable to 
'University of Sussex'). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
